The rejection of a claim interpretation based on an amorphous general inventive idea also formed the starting-point for the post-EPC Swedish approach. The claim interpretations of today can be derived from developments starting by the case of Lännen Tehtaat Oy v Svedbro Smide Aktiebolag. It saw the debut of a critical stance to a doctrine of equivalence based on the notion of a general inventive idea devised by the inventor.
Stockholm District Court had held that the defendant infringed a patent on a mechanical tool under the doctrine of equivalence. 4 The reason put forward was chiefly that the general inventive idea in the patent (how a pedal was used in operating a planting tool) had been used in the accused object. This similarity trumped the fact that there were three differences between the patent claims and the accused device. It was held that the skilled person could have substituted the unfulfilled claim features by the features in the accused device. Svea Court of Appeal, however, held that there was no infringement. 5 The Court referred to the Swedish provision on scope of protection being identical to article 69 EPC and stated that the assumption in an infringement analysis must be that the protection is limited to the claims. True, Svea Court of Appeal agreed with the District Court that the operation of the pedal was the novel and inventive aspect in the invention (the same general inventive idea was used) and that a skilled person could by applying her skills have overcome the differences between the claims and the accused product. Nevertheless, the applicant had set out a certain design in the claims, even when it must have been apparent that the inventive idea could have been used in other, alternative ways. Svea Court of Appeal emphasized the notice function of the claims and the importance of legal certainty for third parties. A patent was not to be interpreted on the basis of a general inventive idea, largely unbounded by the claim wording.
That would unduly burden competitors moving into the technical field of the patent looking for a new solution to the problem solved by the patentee (in one way).
Swedish case law was in this manner set in motion, in common with many other European countries, most notably Germany, in a gradual departure from supposing a general inventive idea. 6 This approach seems to stretch the forbidden field too far and endanger legal 4 Stockholm District Court, Lännen Tehtaat Oy v Svedbro Smide Aktiebolag, case no. T 7-92-85, 11 March1987. 5 Svea Court of Appeal, Lännen Tehtaat Oy v Svedbro Smide Aktiebolag, case no. T 356/87, 7 October 1988. 6 German case law moving away from the use of a general inventive idea has been described by von Drathen: "[I]n the three judgments of the 'quintet', the Federal Supreme Court relates the third Schneidmesser question to the 'responsibility of the patentee' explicitly [citation omitted]. The passage makes clear that the patent specification is an expression of intent by the patentee concerning the protection he wants, and that it is interpreted from the (objectifying) position of a competing inventor who is entitled to rely on the meaning communicated to him. Thus, if the patentee does not formulate the patent claim wide enough to reflect the entire technical content of the invention, a later clarification by him will not permit the courts to grant this protection to him. Article 69 prevents the courts from using a wording-detached 'general inventive idea' [citation omitted] to help the patentee. This reflects the balance of fairness to the patentee and legal certainty for third parties as certainty. It was firmly established that claim limitations cannot usually be disregarded, even if a person skilled in the art realizes that the usefulness of the invention is not delimited according to the claims.
Factors limiting equivalence -the Swedish model
The move away from a belief in a general inventive concept in determining scope of "An issue that the parties in this case have presented their views on is the possibility of awarding a patent a scope of protection beyond its immediate wording, an issue often addressed under the heading equivalence. European legal systems have approached this question from different angels. At the moment there seems to be unity in so far as that there is a scope for including equivalents, however the reach and also the methods for applying the doctrine of equivalence remains unclear. … Some factors should under all circumstances be considered. The state of the art at the application day limits the reach of the scope of protection. The capacity of the person skilled in the art is a factor in the application of the doctrine of equivalence. And in the same vein, a departure from the patent claims, which in itself constitutes a patentable invention, will not be included in the scope of protection under the doctrine of equivalence." On the other hand, if the seven reasons are not regularly present there is usually a scope of protection stretching beyond the claims. An attempt to answer this will form a conclusion from this article. "The Court of Appeal held in the previous case between the parties that there were grounds for a broad determination of the scope of protection because the patent in suit represents a considerable technical advance.
The leading Swedish case -DeLaval v Lely
… As far as [the doctrine of equivalence and] the claim feature "a pre-determined time", the Court finds … that it is clear to a skilled person that the aim of the feature is to prevent milking operations occurring too frequently.
The accused embodiment must be seen as having the same purpose. The solution to this problem in Lely's product entails a decision when a cow enters the milking boot on whether it should be permitted to be milked by a calculation based on the number of milking operations performed in the herd since the cow in question was last milked. Even if the length of the interval may vary depending on how often or seldom the cows have been milked during the last 24 hours and how long each milking operation has taken, the effect achieved by the Lely design is that a minimum duration passes between the milking of one and the same cow. With this background it is, in the opinion of the District court, obvious that the purpose of the Lely design is the same as that of the invention.
Lely has also argued that their milking criterion entails advantages in comparison to the solution in the patent. Lely did in this regard emphasis that their criterion adapts to the behavior of the herd which may vary depending on e.g. the weather conditions. Another advantage put forward by Lely is that its method of determining if a cow is to be milked entails that the cows will always be milked in the 'correct' order, which will be important in case of a technical break-down. The possible advantages gained by Lely's design over the solution according to the patent cannot be considered to be of a magnitude that would lead to the conclusion that the Lely milking criterion achieves a different functional result than with the solution in the patent in suit. The result, irrespective of the solution, is that the cow will be milked at a time when the cow has sufficient milk in the udder. Lely's design must therefore been seen as equally suitable as the invention according to the patent.
According to the determination by the District Court the feature "a pre-determined time" in patent claim 1 cannot, on the basis of the purpose of the invention being to prevent too frequent milking operations, have such decisive significance for the patentability of the invention that the scope for an application of the doctrine of equivalence should be limited for this reason. Nor has it been concluded that DeLaval introduced the feature "a pre-determined time" in order to delineate the invention against the state of the art or in any other way intentionally limit the scope of protection. Lely's milking equipment must on these grounds be concluded to fall within the scope of the patent. The motion brought by DeLaval shall therefore be granted."
Stockholm District Court held that the accused milking robot infringed under the doctrine of equivalence. The judgment was appealed to Svea Court of Appeal, which basically agreed with the lower court. Lely argued that an important difference was that in their product it was unknown at the time of one milking operation when the cow could be milked the next time. With regard to the algorithm used in Lely's milking criterion [a witness for Lely] stated in the Court of Appeal e.g. that animal owners themselves chose a value so that the calculation should fit the number of times a day that the cow is to be milked: if the animal owner e.g. wishes the cow to be milked three times a day it is calculated how many other cows that need to be milked in between. On the basis of this information the District Court's analysis of equivalence seems even more robust, in particular since the purpose of the Lely design and its usefulness, are the same as in the DeLaval invention. Thus, the Court of Appeal shares the District Court's determination that the use of Lely's disputed milking criterion does not literally infringe DeLaval's patent claim, but an infringement has occurred under the doctrine of equivalence. The judgment by the District Court is upheld."
The Swedish Supreme Court did not grant leave to appeal.
To summarize, in the two DeLaval v Lely rulings, the courts have held that "a predetermined time" literally encompasses a milking criterion made up of other components than hours and minutes. When, however, the algorithm did not use hours and minutes at all, the feature was not literally infringed. The alternative of counting cows, aiming to ascertain that a certain portion of the herd has been milked before the same cow can be milked again, was not deemed to be use of a "pre-determined time". No overlap existed between the skilled technicians understanding of the claim and the modified robot. However, counting cows was held to be an equivalent and therefore an infringement.
The two courts applied criteria for determining equivalence that had been referred to in earlier Swedish patent infringement cases, but the criteria had not previously been applied one after the other and leading to a finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalence.
The DeLaval v Lely case therefore confirms an approach for evaluating possible protection outside the literal/technical meaning of the claims. At least since 1988 and the case of Lännen Tehtaat Oy v Svedbro Smide Aktiebolag, the same criteria have been used in Swedish cases on equivalence. But previously only one circumstance was mentioned and it led to a rejection of an extended scope of protection under the doctrine of equivalence. If for example the accused product was designed differently than a feature that had been emphasized and presented as essential during prosecution, this led to the conclusion that the accused product was noninfringing. In the next section of the article the seven factors will be exemplified based on cases where they have been used.
Considerable technical advance or a simple adaptation
In DeLaval v Lely the invention was deemed a considerable technical advance over the prior art on the priority date. This was perceived as a prerequisite for application of the doctrine of equivalence. A factor barring application of the doctrine in earlier cases has been that the invention was characterized by the court as a simple adaptation of the technology known on the priority day. Svea Court of Appeal expressed this view already in the decision Lännen Tehtaat Oy v Svedbro Smide Aktiebolag. The invention was, as mentioned above, a design for a handheld tool used in planting. Later, the same approach was applied in Kvistberga Produkter AB v Guldmann Sverige AB. The Swedish Supreme Court held in Eli Lilly v ratiopharm that the importance, which in the patent description was ascribed to the feature, precluded an equivalent infringement.
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The invention was a pharmaceutical formulation. The claims recited the use of three disintegrants (sodium starch glycolate, polymeric derivatives of acrylic acid and crospovidone). The product accused of trespassing on the patent did not utilize any of these chemical entities, but instead croscarmellose sodium. Croscarmellose sodium was not mentioned in the patent, but technical literature available on the application day indicated that a person skilled in the art would have considered croscarmellose sodium a functional substitute to the disintegrants in the claim. The Supreme Court held that:
"Even if a patent clearly states which components to use equivalence is not excluded if one of the components can be substituted by another of similar technical characteristics. However, in the present case the patent indicates that it is the combination of the components in the claim for producing the tablet, which forms the basis of patentability. Claim 1 defines which disintegrants to use and in the patent description it is said that the choice of disintegrant is one of the most important steps. This entails … that the scope of protection of this patent is limited to pharmaceutical compositions with one of the disintegrants mentioned in the claim."
It was said in the patent description that the choice of disintegrant was an important part of the invention and therefore the Supreme Court believed that it was important for patentability and denied application of the doctrine of equivalence. Only features tangential to the patentability of the invention have a range of equivalents. 
A different purpose
In DeLaval v Lely the courts found that the aim of the pre-determined claim feature was to prevent milking operations occurring too frequently. The accused embodiment achieved the same purpose by counting cows. It was held to be obvious that the purpose of the Lely criterion was the same as that of the criterion in the invention. In previous cases, Swedish courts have denied infringement under the doctrine of equivalence if there was a difference between the purpose stated in the patent for the feature at issue and the purpose for using the corresponding part in the accused product. If the technical problem being solved is different, there is no room for stretching the scope of protection to encompass the attacked product.
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In Kvaerner Masa-Yards v Götaverken Arendal Aktiebolag Svea Court of Appeal held that: "The shape of the bow on the ship Oden does not rely on solutions to problems that are addressed in the patent in suit. As the Odengroup has maintained, this precludes an application of the doctrine of equivalence." 14 The accused ship did not possess the technical advantages that were associated in the patent description with the shape of the patented bow.
In a similar vein, the Supreme Court held in Comviq GSM AB v Europolitan AB that: "Since both the problem that the Twincard is made for and the solution it proposes, is different from Comviq's patented invention, the Twincard cannot be comprised under the scope of protection by an application of the doctrine of equivalence." 15 In Comviq's patent it was said that the main purpose for the invention was to enable differentiation between costs for phone calls of different categories (private, work related, etc.). The Twincard did not achieve such a categorization. The latter phone card aimed at enabling the use of one phone subscription in mobile phones having different card formats.
Improved result in accused product
If the design of the accused product has a purpose different from those mentioned in the patent, it has just been mentioned that there is no room for the doctrine of equivalence.
Equivalence may also be denied if the accused product fulfills the same purpose as the patented invention, but represents an important advance compared to the patent claims. The same technical problem is addressed, but the quality of the solution in the accused product is superior. In such a case there is hardly any room for stretching the scope of protection to the accused product. In the second DeLaval v Lely case considerable efforts were invested in analyzing possible advantages of "counting cows" compared to using a minimum time. The finding that possible advantages with "counting cows" were insignificant allowed application of the doctrine of equivalence.
Stockholm District Court held in FMT v Safegate that laser was not equivalent to microwaves (radar) in a system for measuring distances at airports. 
The difference was beyond the capacity of the skilled person
A fifth reason to deny protection beyond the metes and bounds of the claims could be that the accused product is sufficiently technically advanced for a person skilled in the art to be unable to devise it starting from the claimed product. Lely leads to the conclusion that the patentability of the accused product is in itself practically irrelevant under the Swedish doctrine of equivalence.
legs" which was amended by the addition of the feature "a leaning back", in response to an action from the examiner. It is unlikely that the added feature "a leaning back" can be stretched to e.g. a functionally equivalent vertical back in an infringement case. If a feature is added or redrafted in prosecution it seems that the applicant thereby relinquishes possible equivalents.
In Eli Lilly v ratiopharm the Swedish Supreme Court held with respect to documents from the prosecution history that they could be: "used to interpret unclear patent claims and statements made in the description, as long as it leads to a narrowing of the scope of protection".
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The prosecution history must not result in a stretching of the protection but can occurred in the granting proceedings entails that the patent cannot be given a broader interpretation than that it is directed to a distinct design, with the consequences that this will have for the scope of protection." 24 Third parties can assume in Swedish law that limitations a patentee has put forth in the grant proceedings remain in force many years later in an infringement case. A patentee may not go back on anything he has said or represented to the Swedish or the European Patent
Office. This is important because the vast majority of granted patents have amended or interpreted claims features. Prosecution history estoppel, or file wrapper estoppel, of this kind appears not to be available in some important EPC countries. 25 The estoppel is believed in Swedish law to be valuable, e.g. because the file history often provides pertinent interpretations from the relevant time and is readily accessible by electronic means.
Equivalents of course still remain available for features in an amended claim that has been unaffected by an amendment or interpretation.
Concluding remarks on the Swedish doctrine of equivalents
The Swedish case law that has been discussed in this article limits the scope for In much the same way as animals on the Galapagos Islands have developed unique features in isolation and managed to maintain their characteristics after contacts with other parts of the world, the Swedish approach to claim interpretation has been affected by Article 69 EPC and European case law -foremost by abandoning the general inventive idea -but many unique traits have survived. Article 69 EPC and the Protocol thus seem to be able to accommodate a wide variety of species. Further European harmonization is obviously desirable, but I believe most practicing Swedish lawyers are comfortable with the developments that have taken place in case law. It provides a well-defined template for legal arguments and in most infringement disputes it is relatively easy to determine that no protection beyond a technical and dictionary-like understanding of the claim is available, which furthers legal certainty. It seems likely that the present Swedish law on claim interpretation will survive for quite some time yet, maybe until the ever elusive EU-patent comes in to existence. It is perhaps too much to expect, though, that the Swedish approach will find new habitats.
